Interview with Andre Sauvageot by Currey, Cecil B.
Fort Hays State University 
FHSU Scholars Repository 
Edward Lansdale Interviews Cecil B. & Laura G. Currey Archive of Military History 
August 2021 
Interview with Andre Sauvageot 
Cecil B. Currey 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.fhsu.edu/lansdale_interviews 
Content Disclaimer 
The primary source materials contained in the Fort Hays State University Special Collections 
and Archives have been placed there for research purposes, preservation of the historical 
record, and as reflections of a past belonging to all members of society. Because this material 
reflects the expressions of an ongoing culture, some items in the collections may be sensitive in 
nature and may not represent the attitudes, beliefs, or ideas of their creators, persons named in 
the collections, or the position of Fort Hays State University. 
Recommended Citation 
Currey, Cecil B., "Interview with Andre Sauvageot" (2021). Edward Lansdale Interviews. 59. 
https://scholars.fhsu.edu/lansdale_interviews/59 
This Audio Recording is brought to you for free and open access by the Cecil B. & Laura G. Currey Archive of 
Military History at FHSU Scholars Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Edward Lansdale Interviews by 
an authorized administrator of FHSU Scholars Repository. 
Side 1, Recorded , page 1----~1.Q{~~~ Col. Jean Sauvageot -----------
iS : •• that he would, rather than go over to this meeting on time, if 
neces·sary, he would stay and help you further. 
C: r would appreciate that. 
1.~·: And then r- would go and then he is- going to be leaving early· this-
afternoon. He has other business outs-ide the building, and I will probably· 
be back late. 
C: Well, that, .. since :r can use you for a few moments- later, let -me ask 
you a question, Colonel ,. that ... 
~ : Ok 1 Ive got ten more minutes. 
C: Ok. 
;S: That 1· s - all :r 1ve got. 
C: Ok. 
·or-. Cao fs going to coil)e It '·s: not important, 
C: We have talked about various:::.': factors- tha,t did not work ±n 'Viet Nam, 
,, 
s-tJ;ii:ctly from a -military point of view. I'f you had been a commanding -general , 
what kind of mi:litar-y· activity could the United States- Army· have pu;rsued in 
South View Nam that would ha·ve been succes·sful ? 
s. First of all, I do not think that it is, from my own perspective, it is 
unrealistic and, therefore, analytically infeasible to look at anything in Viet 
Nam from strictly a military point of view. Now, what I mean is that, of 
course, analytically, I know you are trying to separate something out for the 
purpose of analysis, you do have to break it up into discreet parts·, as· you 
are and it is indeed worthwhile to look at our military operations as you are 
'
1quote strictly from a military viewpoint unquote" so I won't try to beg off 
the question. I will try to address it. However, I just want to qualify it by 
saying that I believe that everything we do or did in Viet Nam does have a 
political impact and that the war was basically political, and that the political 
Side 1, Recorded _____________ , page 2---~~~-C(l)l ! · .Jean · Sauvageot 
'S: aspects· governed to some extent the military operations· tn1;1,t are fe9,s-.i::_nle 
or are not feasible. And so, with that qualification, it ±s just difficult 
:!;or 1t1e to do ±t. And, of course, I would say· that, tha.t ... well, let · 1t1e s~y-
this,. I remember when I first came into Viet Nam in August 1964 as· an adviser 
to a. -Vietnamese dis-trict chief, and I was- going on operat±ons, witli.: popula.~ 
forces and with regional forces· and very occas~ona,lly with_ 7th Oiv±s~on, 
ARVN7th Division troops. I remember that what ... how-many of tne 11.So 6:f;ficer-s-, 
of my friends, other Army captains, majors·, lt. colonels-, would often look at 
ARVN tactical operations and with great degrees of reservations, some~ · 
times, disgust, for s -loppy tactics·, not doing the job according to the bes-t of · 
what we tea.ch. at service schools in the United States- Army·, poo!!' infantry 
tactics-, poor coordination of infantry and artillery~ you know-, jus-t poor 
tactics. Lack of aggressiveness in certain situations where aggressivenes·s 
was called for, failure to take up- the pursuit where pursuit operations- were 
called for, a tendency to rely on artillery to take over the infantry~s role. 
In other words, not ... being unwilling to press an assault with human infantrymen, 
but hoping that the artillery could do the job and obviate the need for an 
infantry assault. Well, I remember so many of these American advisers saying 
that, oh, if we could only have American units out here; just give 1t1e an 
American bartt.biJL:il©n. and I' 11 turn this province around so that it will be to 
the right of Ivan the Terrible, you know, politically. All th.is kind of thi_ng 
And I think that people talking this way, you know, at that time never realized 
that it wasn't going to be very long until Lyndon Baines Johnson wauld send 
A;merican units- over there, and he did, and so, you know-, things- turned around 
and people suddenly hadfumf:b::UfQll'. c ommands and company commands and platoons, 
to lead and things· of this· sort, and I would suggest that one of the erro'l'.'s· 
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~: from one standpoint that we made, that many Army units- made or -military 
units-made, was· a carbon copy in some ways of the same errors that the ARVN 
had been making that we criticized. Tried to bring ove!l'..'bearing :!;ire power · 
to replace human beings or infantrymen. Now, the reason the Americans·· did 
that many times was for the same reasons· that the. Vietnamese di.d it; to save 
fl 
lives. Now-, of course, we often, in our doctrine that we study at 'Ft. Benning, 
Georgia in the infantry school and other places that that ma,y not be a true 
way to save lives, because while you may lose more soldiers· right at the ti'Il\e 
you are presBing the asBault aggressively in accordance with the soundest of; 
military doctrines,, in the long run you may sa-ve lives because your- aggress-ive 
a,s·sa,ul t w±ll be effective and, hopefully, vicia te ( sp.? l the enemy units and 
attentuate their strength so that we win the battle and hopefully win the ·,,, 
go· Jon to wi n the war. And so over a shorter period of combat operatiams:· and 
emerging friom the war as· victors, -we end up saving lives as oppos,ed to betng 
engaged in an endles·s- s-talema,te or alternatively·, losi:ng, a,nd ha,v±ng tfiem 
-mop us up, But anyway many American commanders·, jus,t as· thei'T -Vietna,mese · 
c(!)unterparts· that they critiziced so viciperously· Csp?) in the pa,st we't'e 
not a,ble, for -many reascms, to look at the long range; take · tfie · long 't'a,nge · · 
vtew· so a,s· t0 i'1llplement the doctrine that we all espoused and had lea,~ned~ 
because the p't1essure w.as~ on r,ight then not to have tc;,o many· ca,sua,l tie·s-~ · r mean , 
not only humanistic pressure, a natural concern ot ~ commander not to wa,nt to 
get his-men killed, which is laudable and understandable, and pa,rticular,ly of ' 
a commander who has at his beck and call such a wealtn. of fire power, ~ir . 
strikes and artillery and all these things tha,t Amer ican commanders· can-ca,11 
on and that 
A;JWN ) ( · : 
the~comrnancler could call on, but to a. lesser deg'l:;ee~ · so the 
, .. s0 ,. of course, there's a natural let's say huma,n±s-tic tendency to wa,nt to 
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~S: save lives and also of political pressure, particular l y as the war 
went on not to have too -many casual ties. And we all remember the government• s· 
description, that is the government in Washington ts description of casual ties-
f r om an operation as being light and moderate • .. 
C: Uhn, huhn. I'd almost forgotten that. That's right. 
~ Yes, and the commentators and CBS, NBC or whoever would have to do a 
translation for the American people, a translation of the bureaucratic 
euphenisms to some.thing more real world, so :r remember ccmunentators· saying · 
that the casualties were described as light which means moderate, and · on 
operation such and s-uch they were described as· moderate, which. mea_ns· hea,·vy, 
and it just became a kind of a routine translation. Well, tfii& generated · a 
lot of political pres·sure to not be the unit commander: wi .th. i3,n inordinate 
number of casualties, but which also generates· pres·s-ure not to p:1?ess· the.· 
as·sault, to substitute fire power £or men, and to halt operations- with. tne · 
.. , with night, when night comes. You know, we used to talk to the Vietnamese 
counterparts· all the ti-me, take the night away from the VC and you ha,ve_ got 
to be aggress-ive at night . You know- at ·Ft. Leavenworth, Kans-a,s,, at .Ft , Benning, 
Georgia, we loved night operations, but I submit that when we were in Viet Nam 
we didn't love night operations any more than the ARVN d i d , 
With a few- ex ceptions, you know, there were some exceptions-. But I remember · 
wflen a 'Major Peter Dawkins at that time and ·my-self co..--authored a study 
on hamlet security under the direction of Robert Komer , tne deputy-
C0MUSMACV for Civil Operations and Rural Development SUpp0rt, 
ACCORDS is the acronym, and in this study of hamlet s€curity we. ,,well, we 
ha,d a modus~ operandi because we had three people actually-: mys:e.l:e , and Pete 
name which is unintelligible) ,, 
a,nd one Vietnamese employee named (a Vietnamese/ and ~ had wor ked ver y- well , 
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·s-: very good person, worked very well on some very- specia.l programs with 
Vietnamese) 
the American mis-s-ions. Well, Pete Dawkins and (a / would go to vist t, 
sometimes- Vietnamese regional force unit, sometj:.mes- they· would g0 t~ vis-it 
American units-. r would usually visit rural development cadre units- f rom 
Col. Be Na,tional Training Center because at that ti'me I was working with. 
Col . Ee at the National Training Center, and I would go to vis-it them 
~r I would go to visit a popular force unit; in other words, I w~uld always~ 
vi's-it -Vietnamese and they would mix their visits between Vietnamese and 
American. well, the thing is- that ... I remember in Pete Dawkin~-1-se.ction of 
the report, his· criticisms 0f some of the American battalions tha,t he visited 
when night came and they went to implement ... they ceased operations- and 
implemented their patrol plan and he saw some of these patrol plans not be1:ng 
implemented any more than are the Vietnamese counterparts implementing tfiei~ 
patrol plans,. They would go out much shorter distance tha,n they were supposed 
~f rl! r 
to, stop and ~ all night. There was a lot of this kind of thing, and it 1-s 
j.us.-t the truth.; that's the way it was. Anyway, to make a long sto't'y shol'.;t, we 
did come up w-ith some recommendations to create what we called a,t the ti-:me,? 
n i ght a,rmy. It was received initially with enthusiasm by· General Westmore·lana, 
N>ra,ms-, Kome't' h i'lnself, to get both American and Vietnamese out in the night, 
n :_tght operati ons·, all this. But the initial enthusiasm was sup .• , oh, and I 
wa,nt to interrupt myself for a minute and say that we did brie.f ;i:t to tfie 
V:j:etnames-e ~eneral Staff also, at General Abrams' request. Well, then · tney · 
s-ta,·ffed .us, ·and that t s- the last I ever heard o·f it. Now· I' don I t •• , I ca,n 1·t 
tell you all the sequels- to why it was not regarded with much. fa,vor a,fter 
staffing , I really can't comment on that. I just know- that I went bacR to 
tlie Na,t±onal T-raining Center, and we never heard another thing abont this·. 
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S: Now, Dr. Cao isn't here yet, if I can take another 4 or 5 minutes·~ ---
if you want -me to, 
question, 
Well I this is the end of that, of 111.y- response to tnat 
the other things that you were saying 
C: Ok, if I was- hearing some of/"t.l!i-Hiea~e:l:-~;i;~i:a:1:-e}- I tfiink one of . tfie points 
that you made was you would have to follow doctrine if yau we:i:;,e fighting the·· 
war, and you wcmld infer that other people follow doctrine? 
S: Yes·, I think that's right. In other words, you summarized it -ver-y-
succinctly. It seems strange to say, but I think that we would have heen 
netter off from many perspectives if we'd have simply implemented ou:t1 own 
doctrine when we had combat units there, in the same way that we alw~ys told 
the Vietnamese military that they would be better off if tney implemented · 
'I 
our doctrine, and r- think that's generally true. There. are other things·, . 
too I that I would suggest that we would have been -much better o:ef if ,ma,ny, ot · 
our'!l}ilita,ry operations, had resembled a scapel in an openation -mo~e tha.n a 
sledgehammer. Ha,ve I ... 
C: Unintelligible 
S: Yes·, and what I mean is that here we are in a war tha,t :r ha.ve alrea,dy· 
described as being highly political and to be a contes·t between two sides· 
striving to gain a hold on peoples 1 minds, to ga±.n their support tfirough the 
bu±ld.tng of s -t'l'.'0ng institutions·, organizations· tfiat institutiemalized 
behavioral patterns that are functional in terms of whatever s·ide you are on 
I mean peoples·'· organizations, the Communists, getting people i',Ctive,. to be 
a,ct~ve ~r~und some loca.l isaue that they really· care. about, this, kind of 
political --mob±l±zation as it is- called. And in this kind oi a cemtest, there 
±s1 I think, some kind of a correlation between our inordinate use 6t ' tire . 
. , 
powe11 our use of inordinate fire power in response to s-ti)lluli-'th~t have 
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s·: little t0 do with the war or the outcome of the war, and the loss of 
legiti'macy fer the government that we are support±ng and ou~ own presence, 
yeu see. That's a very clumsy way, I guess, of' just say-ing that when you 
kill a lot of the wrong people, non...combatants·, as· a foreigner in tnat 
country, you are handing the Communist enemy for free a lot of pr,Qpog~nda., 
r n fact, they donJt even have to make propoganda. because you yoursel~, •• 
we 0ur-sel-ves, were cl'.'ea,ting the adverse feelings-. 
C: You speke of the inordinate use of fire powe11 ·. Now-, in pa_!,'t tfren~ ., 
pe!t'haps, what might have been was just more commanders• centrol cm tfie: pa,!r]t 
of commanders, who realized what was· needed ana what was· unneces~ary,. , 
S·: Yes, ... 
C: • .. prevented the unneces·s:a:t.Ty· and '1'.,'elegated tha,t ti;:i tne (uni:ntelli_gloJ.el' 
1 ' 
S': Yes·, and r~11 give you an example of a better pit.'.ogram tnat really, wa,s, 
better and that was· the CAF teams, the Marine CAP teams,. 
C: CAPS? 
S-: CAPS. That I s the Comh;i.ned Action Platoons-, I th±nk. i_s,, wlia,t j't stands_. 
for . This· is the progra,m where American ·Mar ines·, Ame;ri'can 11a,r-ine pla,t0.ons, as-
I recall, were ·married up with -Vietnames-e popular forces· and tfiey went on 
operations together and they stayed in one location for an indefinite period 
of ti:me. And they lived with the people and stayed w±th the people. a.nd, wn±le 
I do not believe that the CAP program was a panacea :f;or, ~11 tFia,t ails, -VietNa;m 
as, some e>:f; the 'Marine apologists· or advocates did believe, you knQw·~ :r neve!t' · , 
SP · 
believed with Bill Courson on the, .. I thought his, conception ©f wha,t the C]\P. 
teams· were dei-ng was· somewhat overstated, somewha.t eupho!t;'ic , B.ut after say-±ng 
that i I do believe that it was such a better program than what -most ef the r-est 
of the military was doing, there was absolutely no comparison. One o! the. 
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s·: statistical indicators, and I can't remember the ratio but they- are 
available if you look them up, was that when the CAP teams killed 15 people, 
there was a ·very good chance that you would be able to seize 15 weapons·. 
In other words, you were killing enemy soldiers. Now some of these big 
units killed 15 people, you might not get one weapon or maybe none. In 
other words, there was a lot of bodies, dead bodies, with relatively fews 
weapons, That means in plain English that we are killing ncm-c0mbatants·. 
That's· an indicator, and this is one of the horrible things· about the U.S. 
9th Division down in the Delta. And this was one of the reasons: tha,t 
John Van (.sp?) was· trying so hard behind the scenes to get them the hell 
out of there, because he realized that they were just not the unit for, a 
p(!)litical war, or peoples·' war as the Communists· called it, and John '\fa,n 
knew a lot about it, and he knew why he wanted to get rid of them. Hut 
the CAP team was much, much better and I have to concede to Bill Courson Csp?l 
although as I say, some things I agree with him on, other, things I don't, 
but I have to concede that another thing, and that is· that we don't know-
what would really have happened if the CAP concept had been a,ppl±ed on a 
much wider scope. WI= really don I t know. Now, I know·, that the Cl\P teains-
did not addres·s· some of the sophisticated psychological variables·, that ±s· 
some of the psychological factors I guess is a better, term, they· did not 
address some of the psychological, political factors with great sophistication 
in the villages that probably would have been necessary to address- more in order 
to win the war. I must say also that they did not addres·s some of the political, 
psychological factors as· well as they themselves believed they- were, Because, 
you know, the song and dance that some of the Marine spokesmen gave -me wa,s·, 
well, the Marines are learning to speak Vietn~ese ana the. popula~ force are 
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S: learning to speak English and they really talk tc, the people a,1:>Qnt the±r 
innermost desires and all; when I went into the village I founa. tl:'i:a,t that was· 
just not the case, that the English proficiency of the PF, the. Vietnamese 
proficiency of the Marines- was terribly marginal. They were not able t0 
really get ins~de the heads· of what a lot of the people were thinking, and 
I talked to Vietnamese villagers, farmers that, as Van says,, maybe we:t:'e not 
really pro-Communist but they weren~t really pro-Saigon government eith~ . 
and they really d±d not like having the CAP teams, there in many· cases·, Now-1 
some d±d, but there weI.'e a s,ignificant number who thought that the· Cl\P. team 
presence made a target, a potential target, of their community, and tliey, 
would just as. soon they left, because they did net percei:ve the· Vietnamese 
Communis,ts as a threat to them or their intel'.'ests,, S0, y~u know-, several 
old men and old women told me in conversations, yes·, the CAP teams-, the·· · 
Vietnamese popular forces and the American Marines do a ve'r!y· good j<'Jo: o'.I; 
patrolling at night and they are very active, and they do a ,ye:r;y_, good joo· 
ef trying to secure the village. The only problem is if tney· we{t.' e not here, 
there. would be no security problem, so we would just as, soon they· wQula. le-ave 
and ,, .. you know, of course, the ques-tion is·, if; they leave then won tt the 
Vietnamese Communis-t cad:t,1e come in? And the answer is-, yes-, but SQ. ·wna,t'? 
I mean, who is the Vietnamese Communist cadre, tha,t'·s- -my cousin C'..Vietn~ese · · 
name) and ·uncle (Vietnamese name) and you know·, it just wa,sn •t a b,tg pronlem ·, 
to them . But that was a very big problem in our try·i_ng to a,ddress, the· wottR, · 
r~ve got to go . 
C: Col., I ~preci~te t t so much. 
s: And rt 11 yield to Colonel Be who knows· mo;r:e a,bou t it tha,n I do a.n}:'Wa.y, 
C: May I give you a brief telephone call tomorrow1 
5: Surely, surely. And good luck .. : to y9u . 
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C : Thank you. 
S: Nice to see you again. And thank's a lot, Be, for helping ·me with the 
-more •.. you couldn '·t be talking to a better source here. 
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